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MANAGERIAL MODELS
OF COMPETITIVE DYNAMICS:
ADDRESSING THE RELEVANCE ISSUE
IN GAME THEORETIC MODELING
ABSTRACT
Game theory provides a useful tool for formally modeling strategic interaction. For the most
part, however, the application of game theory to describe strategic interaction has not reached its full
potential. To provide greater relevance for strategy research, this paper suggests that future game
theoretic investigations be redirected to devote more attention to executive models of competitive
dynamics. Game theoretic research should be grounded in a better understanding of managerial
cognition about competitors.

Game theory can be a useful tool for understanding and describing competitor behavior.
Fruhan (1972) and Sultan (1974) recognized the fruitfulness of game theoretic modeling for
comprehending competitive dynamics. Renewed interest within strategic management was sparked by
Porter's (1980) game theoretic analysis of competitive moves over time. Numerous theorists also
have suggested that mathematical modeling is needed to advance the rigor of strategic management
research (Camerer, 1985, 1991; Montgomery, 1988). Utilizing game theoretic models, industrial
organization economics is increasingly making strides in exploring hypothesized results in stylistic
oligopolistic settings (Friedman, 1977; Fudenberg and Tirole, 1989; Kreps, 1990a; Shapiro, 1989;
Tirole, 1988).
Many observers note that game theory's promise has not been realized in descriptive,
empirical research on competitive dynamics (Camerer, 1991; Fisher, 1989; Saloner, 1991; Weigelt
and MacMillan, 1988; Zajac and Bazerman, 1991). This paper argues that game theory's possibilities
for apprehending dynamics in real competitive interactions remain significant, but that strategic
management has only begun to tap potential applications. For example, Conner's (1988) work on
product cannibalism based on a patent race game, and Weigelt and MacMillan's (1988) formal model
of managerial perceptions under conditions of incomplete information are exemplars that might lead to
improved managerial decision making by more explicitly specifying managerially relevant options and
payoffs in dynamic competitive situations.
Game theoretic research in strategic management needs to be explicitly redirected to focus on
constructing managerial models of competitive situations by utilizing cognitive methods to elicit key
game parameters. Rubinstein (1991: 919) argues that:
If we adopt the view that a game is not a rigid description of the physical rules of the world
then a game-theoretic model should include only those factors which are perceived by the
players to be relevant. Modelling requires intuition, common sense, and empirical data in
order to determine the relevant factors entering into the players' strategic considerations and
thus should be included in the model. This requirement makes the application of game theory
more an art than a mechanical algorithm.
A cognitive approach to game theoretic modeling may provide relevant descriptions of real
competitive dynamics that are needed to invigorate game theoretic investigations. Before attempts are
made to prescribe normative advice, descriptions of management practice should precede both
mathematically rigorous game theoretic analysis and behavioral investigations (Bowman and Johnson,
1992). If the cognitive foundations of game theory are not provided, normative game theory research
may be providing advice on how to execute strategies that are not applicable to management practice.
The development of game theoretic models in strategic management has concentrated on a
circumscribed set of game formulations, most notably the Prisoner's Dilemma (Oster, 1990; Porter,
1980), the Cournot game of output determination, and the Bertrand game of pricing strategy
(Camerer, 1991; Saloner, 1991). There is scant evidence that these games characterize managers'
understanding of their competitive circumstances 1 . The field has made few attempts to elicit
managerial cognitive models of competitive dynamics (Weigelt and MacMillan, 1988).
The purpose of this paper, then, is to focus attention on game theory's ability to formalize the
implicit competitive models held by managers. Several examples are provided to illustrate game
theory's ability to capture some of the richness and variety of managerial understanding of
competitive circumstances. These prototypes are meant only to exemplify the potential that a
managerial cognitive approach can add to game theoretical analysis. They are not meant to be an
exhaustive taxonomy of game theoretical formulations that might be applicable to industrial
competition. We submit that the game formulations that are most important for describing industrial
competition are those in the minds of the strategic decision makers. The fundamental challenge of
this approach for game theorists is to utilize appropriate methods to uncover and accurately represent
managers' mental models of competitive dynamics. These descriptive models can then be subjected to
mathematical and behavioral scrutiny to explain and predict competitive outcomes and offer normative
advice to managers.
Executives almost always make decisions without knowledge of all values in the payoff matrix
and must, therefore, rely on their beliefs and assumptions about competitors; beliefs and assumptions
that may very well differ from those held by researchers (Porac and Thomas, 1990; Saloner, 1991;
Weigelt and MacMillan, 1988). Therefore, game theoretic research in strategic management should
begin with an understanding of executive cognition to better understand firm behavior.
A COGNITIVE GAME THEORETIC APPROACH
A cognitive approach to game theoretic modeling recognizes the primacy of managers' mental
models for understanding strategic action (Dutton, 1993; Porac and Thomas, 1990; Reger and Huff,
1993; Weick, 1979). In particular, we depart from the deductive economics approach of game theory
that assumes unlimited cognitive capabilities of players. We suggest that models of bounded
rationality (Simon, 1982) are more relevant to strategic management, as a pragmatic field. To
illustrate this point, we note that since the game of chess is a game of complete and perfect
information, in principle we can use backward induction to solve the game (Von Neumann and
Morgenstern, 1944), however, game theory does not specify how one should play the game. On the
other hand, models of bounded rationality concentrate on heuristics to aid those who are puzzled on
"what to do?" A quote from Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947: 125) is worth repeating:
if the theory of Chess were fully known there would be nothing left to play. The theory
would show which of the three possibilities (white wins, white ties, or white loses) actually
holds, and accordingly the play would be decided before it starts ... But our proof, which
guarantees the validity of one (and only one) of these alternatives, gives no practically usable
method to determine the true one. This relative human difficulty [of bounded rationality]
necessitates the use of those incomplete, heuristic models of playing, which constitute "good"
chess; and without it there would be no element of "struggle" and "surprise" in that game.
In this paper, the cognitive "struggle" of business executives' "managerial mental models" are
brought to the foreground of the game-theoretic approach. The cognitive model in Figure 1
summarizes the impact of executive assessments of key elements of strategic domains on competitive
dynamics. Competitive interaction, in turn, shapes industry structure (Porter, 1980; Reger and Huff,
1993). Feedback loops from industry structure and competitive dynamics consider the effects of
these factors on managers' conceptions (Huff, 1982; Porter, 1980; Prahalad and Bettis, 1986).
Insert Figure 1 about here
To abstract the essential cognitive elements of any competitive situation requires that
managerial beliefs about three generic parameters be elicited. First, the researcher must uncover
managerial opinions about relevant players, that is, the actors decision makers judge to be
competitors. Next, managerial assessments of alternative strategies available to those players must be
extracted. Finally, managerial estimations of the payoffs associated with each set of strategies
provides the third ingredient in modeling decision makers' conceptions of the competitive
environment. Inescapably, as indicated in Figure 1, the amount of communication, market signaling,
and subjective evaluations of others influence managerial assessments of these three basic parameters.
The paper is organized in four parts. First, the vital roles of market signaling and
competitive reputation in shaping executive perceptions of the generic parameters are examined.
Second, the significance of managerial judgments about these three parameters-players, strategies,
payoffs—for describing competitive dynamics is illustrated. Illustrations include prototypical examples
of the volatile implications of divergent belief structures within an industry. Third, a cognitive
approach to game theory is contrasted with mathematical and behavioral approaches. Finally, some
of the future research directions that a cognitive approach to game theoretic modeling opens are
outlined. Issues for empiricists interested in eliciting and building cognitive game theoretic models
are discussed in the appendix.
MARKET SIGNALING AND COMPETITIVE REPUTATION
Competitors often must resort to market signaling to communicate intentions and desires (Heil
and Robertson, 1991; Porter, 1980). Antitrust law prohibits many types of direct communications
and formal agreements between rivals (Scherer and Ross, 1990). Thus, in the absence of overt
agreements, market signals can encourage interfirm coordination. Heil and Robertson define
competitive market signals as "announcements or previews of potential actions intended to convey
information or to gain information from competitors" (1991: 403). This paper adopts a broader
definition of market signals to include any announcement or action that conveys information or gains
information from competitors whether intended or not2 .
Market signaling, because it influences rivals' perceptions of ambiguous environments, is a
critical component for understanding competitive dynamics (Fombrun and Shanley, 1990; Heil and
Robertson, 1991). As depicted in Figure 1, an opportunity is created for rivals to influence each
other's perceptions of players, viable strategic options and payoffs. Through market signaling, rivals
attempt to learn or change others' perceptions of the nature of the game. Intentional signals are sent
to competitors to communicate which game the firm wishes its opponents to believe they are playing,
or to communicate which set of joint actions is preferred. Of course, firms may, intentionally or not,
send mixed messages that increase rather than decrease ambiguity.
The first role of market signaling is to convince rivals of the kind of game being played. In
industrial competition, it is often impossible for a firm to be sure about the nature of the game it is
playing since strategic alternatives and payoffs are rarely known with certainty. Typically, the
company knows payoffs associated with actual historical choices, and these outcomes are only loosely
coupled to choices (Weick, 1979). Perceptions are critical. Rubinstein argues that: "a good model
in game theory has to be realistic in the sense that it provides a model for the perception of real life
social phenomena" (1991: 910). Strategists have the opportunity to influence others' judgments
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because firms' managers are forced to act on their beliefs, not on objective reality. Market signaling
that influences rivals' perceptions of the nature of competition in the industry and, therefore, affects
their strategic choice behavior, is decisive to competitive success.
In addition to attempts to influence perceptions about the nature of the game, rivals also
communicate which strategy they plan to adopt and which actions they hope other firms in the
industry will pursue (Heil and Robertson, 1991). Thus, the second role of market signals is to
communicate which set of joint actions is preferred. For instance, to "minimize the provocation"
(Porter, 1980), a rival communicates that it is choosing a cooperative strategy, given the game being
played and the strategies available to it. Without this market signal, rivals might perceive the action
to be more aggressive than the firm intended. This misinterpretation could lead to a costly
competitive battle that harms all players. One example of this scenario is a dominant firm may
attempt to persuade its smaller rivals that it is being statesmanlike, even though its action may appear
hostile to an observer unaware of the firm's available strategic options. If the smaller firms'
managers ignore the signal, an undesirable war could result that leaves them in lesser preferred
positions than if they had heeded the market signal. Similarly, once rivals understand the need to
develop industry standards, signaling is often aimed at establishing the specifics of industry norms on
such practices as pricing, advertising/sales ratios and discount levels (Heil and Robertson, 1991).
These signs provide guides to rivals that influence their interpretation of otherwise ambiguous
strategic actions 3 (Weigelt, Camerer and Hanna, 1992).
Because industrial competition usually unfolds over many years, strategists have a rich
memory store of competitors' past actions and outcomes (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1990; Huff,
1982). These assessments of competitors become synthesized into a firm's competitive reputation4
(Fombrun and Shanley, 1990). Competitive reputation is defined as the beliefs held by rivals about
the firm concerning the firm's posture in the industry. Our view of reputation suggests that
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reputation is disaggregated by constituent group, a view somewhat at odds with Fombrun and Shanley
(1990). Fombrun and Shanley suggest that "individual interpretations aggregate into collective
judgments that crystallize into reputational orderings of firms in organizational fields" (1990: 234).
The perspective we develop here is that different stakeholders filter information differently, because
they seek divergent results from the firm and thus evaluate the firm by different criteria. Therefore,
it is not unreasonable to suggest that various stakeholders may hold radically different ideas about the
firm's reputation. For example, customers could hold a firm in high esteem (positive market
reputation) while investors are less enamored (poor financial reputation) and rivals overtly distrust it
(poor cooperative reputation).
Importantly, a competitive reputation develops over time as rivals interpret the firm's
announcements and actions. Market signals may include bluffs, lies or what economists call
"cheaptalk" 5 (nonbinding preannouncements) that may not necessarily be followed (Camerer, 1991;
Farrell, 1987). However, in long-term repeated games that characterize much of industrial
competition, any short-term gains from misleading announcements are likely to result in long-term
reputational losses. Since strategic firms are aware of the value of their reputations, it is expected
that they would trade off short-term gains for longer-term reputational gains (Fombrun and Shanley,
1990). If a firm repeatedly engages in misleading cheaptalk, unintended signals may convey more
accurate informational content than intended messages. In such cases, rivals are expected to learn to
ignore deceptive, intended messages. Again, to describe industrial competition, it is not appropriate
for an outside observer to impose interpretations on market signals. Rather, managerial
interpretations must be elicited to uncover subtleties that may not be readily apparent to outsiders
(Gioia and Chittipeddi, 1991; Reger and Huff, 1993).
Delineating the influence of market signaling on managerial assessments of key game
parameters is critical for developing accurate managerial models of industrial competition. Notably,
competitive reputation, which results from the interpretation of past market signals, actions, and
outcomes over time, provides salient cues as to the veracity and significance of current and future
market signals. Thus, both current market signals and competitive reputation impact executive
assessments of key aspects of competitive dynamics. Market signals and reputation should be given a
more central focus in game theoretic attempts to describe industrial competition.
PREEMPTION AND INDUSTRY NORMS
Next, this paper considers examples to illustrate the rich potential of a cognitive game
theoretic approach for describing competitive dynamics in interdependent industries. In competitor
analysis, it has been suggested that preemption and developing competitive norms may provide the
greatest opportunities for potential benefits while also carrying the greatest risks (Heil and Robertson,
1991). Since game theoretic analysis is appropriate in any situation in which firms are inter-
dependent (Jacquemin, 1987; Tirole, 1988), these two types of dynamics can be generalized to a
wider variety of competitive circumstances.
The preemption pattern is constructed from research reports of industrial competition in the
electrical turbine industry, while the development of competitive norms is abstracted from popular
press accounts of the early time period in the VCR industry. These examples ground the theoretical
discussion of a cognitive approach to game theoretic modeling in specific contexts to better illustrate
the potential of the approach. These cases are open to multiple interpretations, and in fact, a central
argument here is that the managers involved may very well have had different interpretations of their
competitive situations than outsiders attempting to construct game theoretic models based on
secondary sources.
First, to illustrate when preemption is possible, managerial perceptions of capacity expansion
decisions are modeled with two alternative game formulations. The Chicken game, which is
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especially promising for understanding preemption, is contrasted with the Prisoner's Dilemma (PD)
game. Although focused on capacity expansion decisions, the dynamics modeled here apply to a wide
range of competitive circumstances including pricing, introducing new technology and advertising
(Heil and Robertson, 1991). Second, the Battle of the Sexes game, which rewards concerted action
(Luce and Raiffa, 1957), and thus provides a template for understanding imitation and competitive
norms of conduct, is offered to illuminate cooperative behavior between rivals.
Modeling Preemption: A Capacity Expansion Illustration
Theorists have suggested that capacity expansion decisions are usually strategic because "they
involve substantial capital, are considerably complex, and have the potential to influence competition
and profitability" (Zajac and Bazerman, 1991: 44; Porter, 1980). Game theoretic analysis is central
in a landmark study of capacity expansion in the electrical turbine oligopoly (Sultan, 1974). In this
study, the Prisoner's Dilemma formulation was applied to the relationship between Westinghouse and
General Electric with respect to capacity expansion. A simple mathematical representation of a
Prisoner's Dilemma game is illustrated in the top panel of Figure 2. 6
Insert Figure 2 about here
PD games lead rational competitors to follow decision rules similar to the one Sultan proposed
to describe the decision process he observed:
Each of the two major competitors may increase his own manufacturing
capacity in proportion to the perceived amount of expansion of his major rival.
General Electric managers may be stimulated to add capacity merely because
Westinghouse is adding capacity, and vice versa. Such an interdependent mode of
expansion would be consistent with theorizing concerning strategic behavior in
oligopoly (1975:183).
In the electrical turbine oligopoly, which did not experience chronic overcapacity or suffer
low profits, the major players appeared to agree that theirs was a repeated PD game. If
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Westinghouse had aggressively added capacity, the best strategy for GE would have been to also add
substantial capacity. Armed with at least a tacit understanding of the repeated PD game matrix, both
rivals perceived that the result of large capacity expansions would be industry-wide overcapacity, that
is, the D1D2 payoff of (1,1) found in cell 4 in the top frame of Figure 2. Since both players
appeared to be aware of the "rules of the game," Sultan (1975) argued, neither tried to preempt the
other with very large capacity additions. In game theoretic terms, in a repeated PD game with an
unknown ending to the game, cooperation between General Electric and Westinghouse may be an
equilibrium outcome7 .
Porter, unlike Sultan, considers a more static version of the PD game (e.g., a one-period
game or a game with a known finite ending) and thus recommends preemption as the individually
rational choice in PD games (Porter, 1980; Porter and Spence, 1982). If rational rivals perceive a
true PD formulation as portrayed in Figure 2, preemption will not be collectively rational (successful)
but unfortunately, preemption will be individually rational because the payoff for unilateral
cooperation is less than the payoff for reciprocal defection. Preemption is always the best action
given the other player's choice. In game theoretic terms, preemption is a dominant strategy for each
player and consequently D1D2 is a dominant strategy equilibrium 8 .
If rivals can be induced to perceive payoffs consistent with another mixed motive game, the
Chicken game, Porter's advice is also sound and preemption becomes a rational alternative. A
standard mathematical interpretation of the Chicken game matrix is shown in the center panel of
Figure 2. 9 Subtle differences in the PD and Chicken game payoff structures dramatically affect the
amount of cooperation and competition likely to occur. In the Chicken game, the payoff from joint
competition is less than for unilateral cooperation; whereas in the PD game, this situation is reversed.
There are two pure strategy (Nash) equilibrium outcomes, C1D2 and D1C2. If a distinction is made
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between a true PD game and a Chicken game, the fundamental difference between the two games has
profound, and predictable, strategic implications:
The chicken game differs from the PD game... in that the DD outcome had the
lowest payoff in the game (simulating the disaster of a head-on collision). This means
that the competitive move does not completely dominate the cooperative move [as in
PD], and therefore the rational response to a highly competitive other is to cooperate,
whereas in the PD game it is to compete (Oskamp, 1972: 148).
In his review of various strategies in mixed motive games, Oskamp (1972) notes that not only
are these differences rational from the structure of the payoff matrices, but perhaps more interesting,
these differences are observed in empirical behavioral studies. In PD, subjects respond to highly
competitive opponents by competing; in the Chicken game, they back down. For a preemptive
strategy to be successful, rivals must believe that they will be better off (in game theory terms, will
receive a larger payoff) by not adding capacity than they will be by matching the aggressor's would-
be preemptive move. The importance of knowing which game the participants think they are playing
should be self-evident. For preemption to be successful, rivals must first be convinced that they are
playing a Chicken game, not a Prisoner's Dilemma.
Consideration of multiple models allows us to begin to understand why industries develop
differently. Sultan's (1975) report can be reconciled with Porter's (1980) prescriptions. These
authors outline similar games, but ones where decision makers perceived disparate payoff structures
(due to e.g., static versus dynamic conceptions or different conceptions of the type of game being
played). As the disparate recommendations of each author illustrates, seemingly minor differences in
perceptions of payoff structures and time horizons can lead to quite different competitive dynamics.
Modeling Norms of Competitive Conduct
Another significant game theoretic formulation, the "Battle of the Sexes" game 10 is
promising for understanding competition that results in industry standards or norms of competitive
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conduct (Heil and Robertson, 1991). More generally, the Battle of the Sexes game may model any
situation when rivals perceive coordination to be necessary (Weigelt, Camerer and Hanna, 1992). In
the Battle of the Sexes game, players have the highest payoffs for concerted action. The early VCR
industry may provide one illustration of the dynamics of this game. One interpretation of the early
preferences of Sony and its competitors is shown in the bottom panel of Figure 2. 11 In this scenario,
Sony preferred its Beta format while competitors favored VHS. Videotape producers and rental
stores pressed for industry standardization on one format to reduce production and inventory costs.
Eventually, the VHS design dominated, and Sony withdrew Beta from the consumer market even
though many industry observers believed it was technologically superior. Perhaps Sony assumed
technological dominance was the primary strategic issue for this market. If so, a Chicken game
would explain Sony's actions: they aggressively promoted the Beta format and refused to license it
hoping rivals would "turn away" from the market. However, if the Battle of the Sexes model is an
accurate interpretation of payoffs in the industry, industry standardization was crucial to competitive
success. Sony's rivals appear to have believed a Battle of the Sexes game realistically modeled their
competitive circumstances. Unable to match Sony because it refused to license Beta, rivals formed a
successful alliance based on VHS technology, instead of each attempting to market unique formats.
Implications of Divergent Belief Structures Within an Industry
The models discussed above are admittedly simple and the examples, although based on
managerial conceptualizations, are abstracted and stylized for illustrative purposes. Empirical
research is likely to uncover more complicated and more interesting cases, such as when one player
thinks the game is PD and another is playing the Chicken game. When competitors fail to recognize
divergent perceptions of payoff matrices, strategic mistakes may be especially likely (Harrigan, 1985;
Zajac and Bazerman, 1991).
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For example, Fruhan (1972) employed the Prisoner's Dilemma logic to model the
interdependency of capacity expansion decisions for airline industry rivals. His observations
supported Sultan's findings—one firm's "defection" or aggressive capacity building was most often
countered with similarly hostile capacity building by rival airlines. Unlike the electrical turbine
industry, however, the airline industry suffered from chronic overcapacity and low profitability even
before deregulation (Fruhan, 1972).
Fruhan (1972) concluded that, given the industry's cost structure and idiosyncratic assets (i.e.,
given the payoff structure inherent in PD games), the reacting airlines' actions were rational—their
best strategy was to follow the lead of any capacity additions, even if it led to industry-wide
overcapacity. But what about the would-be preemptors? Why would firms attempt to preempt rivals
in a PD game, knowing that gentlemanly cooperation would lead to higher payoffs? In other words,
why were the airlines unable to learn the lesson Westinghouse and GE seemed to have understood so
well? One possibility, based on Zajac and Bazerman (1991) and Porter's (1980) analysis of
preemption in capacity expansion decisions, is that the airline industry's chronic overcapacity was the
result of judgment errors stemming from competitive blind spots.
At least three types of judgment errors could have been operating in the airline industry.
First, the rivals may not have been aware of their interdependences. This seems unlikely given the
long history of interdependent competition in this industry. Second, the aggressors may not have
believed they were playing a PD game. If they believed the game was the Chicken game, for
instance, then preemptory actions were reasonable. Third, perhaps the aggressors' actions were
intended as market signals aimed at changing their competitors' perceptions about the nature of the
game. If an airline could convince a rival that the game was a Chicken game, then a rational
response to aggressive capacity expansion would be to exit that route. To understand outcomes of
strategic interaction, research must focus on eliciting managerial mental models.
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In another example, during the early days of the personal computer industry, several
operating systems competed. But most rivals perceived the compelling need to standardize on one
operating system so that business customers would adopt personal computers in large numbers. IBM,
as a dominant player, was able to force that standardization on IBM's preferred option, the DOS
operating system. Of the major players, only Apple failed to adopt the DOS environment. Again,
we could call this a competitive blind spot and suggest that Apple's management was irrational. But
to do so would mean that we know with certainty that this was a Battle of the Sexes game, and
Apple's payoffs (e.g., future profits) would have been higher if they would have acquiesced to IBM's
preferred standard. Since the payoffs of actions not taken are impossible to determine in industrial
competition, a cognitive approach to game theoretic modeling suggests that belief structures must be
elicited from the key decision makers in order to understand the rationale behind their actions.
A critical contribution of a cognitive approach to game theoretic modeling is the explicit
recognition that managers at competing firms might view competition quite differently (Daniels and
Johnson, 1992; Harrigan, 1985; Porac and Thomas, 1990). Decision makers can only be boundedly
rational (Cyert and March, 1963; Simon, 1982) when making decisions about competitive dynamics.
Decisions which appear to be irrational, or to represent "competitive blind spots" (Zajac and
Bazerman, 1991) to competitors or to industry outsiders may actually be quite rational given the
information and beliefs about players, strategies and payoffs of the those involved in the decision .
Developing cognitive game theoretic models for competing firms allows the ramifications of such
cases to be explored. Research conducted with valid and reliable cognitive methodologies as
discussed in the appendix to this paper may be able to represent competitive dynamics more
realistically, especially when rivals disagree about the true nature of the game.
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Adding a Cognitive Approach to Existing Game Theoretic Approaches
Recent strategic research in this area has gone astray by pursuing equilibrium solutions to
games of interest to theorists without adequately grounding formulations in managerial practice
(Postrel, 1991). There is nothing intrinsically wrong with an equilibrium approach as it appears to
serve economics well and provides insights into potential competitive outcomes (Camerer, 1991;
Wernerfelt and Karnani, 1987; Weigelt, Camerer and Hanna, 1992). However, simplifying
assumptions necessary to accommodate mathematical solutions in game theoretic models may not
accurately reflect industrial competition (Zajac and Bazerman, 1991).
Behavioral game theorists have found that even slight changes in game parameters can have
profound effects on the strategies individuals adopt and on game outcomes (Murnighan, 1991;
Oskamp, 1972; Rapoport and Guyer, 1966). Observation suggests that firms, like individuals,
behave quite differently in competitive situations that are not too disparate. Research that uncovers
subtleties in managers' mental models of their competitive arena may add to economic explanations of
industry heterogeneity (Camerer, 1991; Porac and Thomas, 1990; Reger and Huff, 1993).
A cognitive approach to game theoretic modelling adds significantly to mathematical analysis
and behavioral experiments, the two approaches to game theory currently being applied to competitive
dynamics. Table 1 explicitly contrasts how each of these three address key issues in modeling
competition.
A cognitive approach argues that to understand rivals' actions, the important questions are not
what game and which cell are being played. Rather, the focus must be on the game(s) the
participants think they are playing and the strategies they believe have been chosen. As Kreps notes,
a shared understanding of the "rules of the game" may be "the product of long-term experience by a
society of boundedly rational and retrospective individuals" (1990b: 183) 12 . In ambiguous
environments, executive assessments of all game parameters-players, strategies, payoffs and the
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meaning of market signals—take on increased importance. Once managerial mental models are
elicited and formalized, mathematical and behavioral game theory provide the mechanisms for
exploring the ramifications of these models for competitive dynamics and industry evolution.
Insert Table 1 about here
FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
When attention is directed toward modeling managerial conceptions of competitive dynamics,
many important research questions are answerable using game theoretic models. For example, how
executives decide what game they are playing, who they watch as interdependent players and the
attributions they make concerning rivals' market signals and actions can all be addressed by
empirically deriving payoff matrices. First, executives should become data sources to develop
perceptually based understanding of competitive dynamics (Huff, 1990; Porac, Thomas and Baden-
Fuller, 1989; Reger and Huff, 1993). Once the key elements are elicited from decision makers and
formalized into payoff matrices, empirical research can test theories about strategies and outcomes
under controlled conditions. These tests include behavioral experiments (Camerer, 1991; Green and
Kagel, 1990; Murnighan, 1991; Oskamp, 1972; Saloner, 1991; Zajac and Bazerman, 1991),
mathematical solutions (Camerer, 1991; Saloner, 1991; Weigelt and MacMillan, 1988), computer
simulations (Bruderer and Mitchell, 1992), and behavioral simulations with executive samples.
Laboratory experiments may be especially promising as the four parameters can be systematically
varied to shed light on how industries develop under various conditions (Weigelt, Camerer and
Hanna, 1992). In this area, researchers can build on the extensive behavioral game theoretic
literature, but should also realize that much of the extant research may have only limited application
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to executive decision making since it often utilizes student reactions to researcher contrived games
(Murnighan, 1991; Oskamp, 1972; Weigelt, Camerer and Hanna, 1992).
Clearly, executives make mistakes and suffer from competitive blind spots (Zajac and
Bazerman, 1991). Strategic decision makers can unwittingly destroy a favorable industry structure by
basing their actions on erroneous beliefs (Porter, 1980). A cognitive approach to game theory opens
a significant avenue for future research. Managerial models can be compared to expert models based
on objective assessments of industry conditions. The comparison of economic and managerial
positions should enrich both perspectives and help to break down artificial research barriers (Reger
and Huff, 1993; Zajac and Bazerman, 1991).
To date, game theoretic research has tended to be either theoretical (e.g., a search for
mathematical, equilibrium solutions) or behavioral (e.g., an examination of equilibrium solutions that
emerge in experimental play). While psychology has focused on behavioral dynamics of experimental
play, economics has primarily scrutinized mathematical, equilibrium solutions and has only adopted
behavioral protocols relatively recently (Green and Kagel, 1990; Weigelt, Camerer and Hanna, 1992).
By utilizing cognitive methodologies to uncover managerial conceptions of key game parameters in
genuine competitive dynamics, strategy researchers can add to both mathematical and behavioral game
theoretic research by providing interesting and potentially more realistic models as input for their
respective analyses.
The perspective developed here is necessarily limited. Many other mixed motive games have
been specified that might also provide additional insight into industrial competition (Murnighan, 1991;
Oskamp, 1972; Rapoport and Guyer, 1966; Rasmusen, 1989). The Chicken game is particularly
relevant because it carries almost opposing strategy implications compared to PD, and because it
accounts for a commonly observed industry pattern of dominant industry leader with smaller niche
competitors. The Battle of the Sexes game is promising as it models environments where cooperation
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is more important than competition. The crucial point of a managerial cognitive approach to game
theory, however, is that the most influential formulations for understanding strategic action are the
ones in the minds of managerial players.
Competitive dynamics are as likely to entail sequential as simultaneous competitive moves.
Theorists have noted that extensive form payoff matrices are more appropriate in such cases
(Myerson, 1991; Oster, 1990; Weigelt and MacMillan, 1988). The primary contrast between simple
matrices such as those presented in this paper and extensive form games relate to differences in
finding equilibrium solutions, that is, solving for the optimal strategy. For competitive sensemaking,
deriving simple matrices might actually be preferred due to the cognitive limitations of users
(Schwenk, 1984). Nonetheless, empiricists are urged to also consider extensive forms to determine if
they better capture executive models.
CONCLUSIONS
Game theoretic concepts, especially the Prisoner's Dilemma formulation, have been used in
strategic management for some time and have been given new exposure recently. This paper argues
for the importance of adding managerial conceptions to game theoretic modeling. A cognitive
approach provides needed insights into the diversity of competition and cooperation exhibited across
industries and within an industry as it evolves. The Prisoner's Dilemma, the Chicken game, and the
Battle of the Sexes game, which were used to illustrate possible managerial conceptions of competitive
dynamics, are especially promising for strategic management because the incentives for competition
and cooperation, for preemption and imitation, vary systematically in these three game formulations.
Game theory's ability to model manager's beliefs about the key components of competitive
conditions also may have practical applications. As a decision support aid, alternative game
formulations can become a focal point in policy dialogues through providing competing models of
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competitive situations (Bruderer and Mitchell, 1992; Mason and Mitroff, 1981; Schwenk and
Thomas, 1983; Thomas, 1982). That is, they can provide stylized archetypes that bootstrap the
decision team's expertise in ambiguous situations (Weigelt and MacMillan, 1988).
The incorporation of a managerial cognitive perspective can enrich game theory applications
for strategic management issues. Industrial organization economics progresses in developing
sophisticated theory and solutions for a variety of game formulations. The strategy field should
continue to monitor and incorporate this work in our own endeavors. While not every article must
have immediate practical application, the strength of strategy research rests on its direct applicability
to practice (Montgomery, Wernerfelt and Balakrishnan, 1989). Research that seeks to model real
competitive situations based on empirical observation adds pragmatism without sacrificing game
theory's attractive rigor. To revitalize game theoretic research in strategic management, there is a
need to shift the focus from mathematical solutions of abstract games to managerial assessments of
competitive dynamics in real industries. We believe that Rubinstein provides the best summary of
this position:
We are attracted to game theory because it deals with the mind. Incorporating psychological
elements which distinguish our minds from machines will make game theory even more
exciting and certainly more meaningful (1991: 923).
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APPENDIX
This appendix outlines a cognitive approach to each of the key game theoretic parameters
discussed in the paper and addresses several empirical issues in constructing game theory formulations
based on managerial assessments. A cognitive approach gives primacy to managerial beliefs about
each of the key parameters-players, strategies and payoffs.
Players
Relevant players are limited to those firms that decision makers recognize as interdependent.
Thus, players may include all firms in an industry (Oster, 1990; Porter, 1980) or may be restricted to
those within a particular strategic group (Huff and Reger, 1993). In some cases, they may span
traditional industry boundaries (Fombrun and Zajac, 1987). Players may even be confined to pairs of
firms that jockey for position between themselves while largely ignoring others in their industry.
Although it is true that companies may be interdependent without realizing it, germane to the
approach developed here, a rival must recognize the interdependency. If interdependencies are not
recognized, strategic mistakes may be uncovered in postmortems (Zajac and Bazerman, 1991). But,
unless the players realize they must consider competitor's actions, those actions will have no effect on
their strategies.
Generic game formulations, such as the Prisoner's Dilemma, are often presented as two
player games although recent research has begun to examine multi-player games (Bernheim and
Whinston, 1986; Camerer, 1991). This simplifying convention greatly aids mathematical analysis to
reach equilibrium solutions, but has been criticized for being unrealistic (Weigelt and MacMillan,
1988). This simplification may not be as serious as previously thought because, as was true in
Weigelt and MacMillan's (1988) study, cognitive research suggests that managers consider a
surprisingly small set of firms when making competitive decisions (Daniels and Johnson, 1992;
Gripsrud and Gronhaug, 1985; MacMillan, McCaffery and Van Wijk, 1985; Porac, Thomas, and
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Baden-Fuller, 1989; Reger and Noble, 1992). Even if executives recognize multiple rivals, additional
players present substantial problems for finding equilibrium solutions , but create only relatively minor
issues for understanding managerial conceptions of the nature of competition.
Multiple rivals add to the complexity of structuring competitive dynamics primarily by
providing the ability for coalitions to form (Komorita and Tumonis, 1980; Murnighan, Komorita and
Szwajkowski, 1977). Coalitions may be overt and formal, such as joint ventures and other
cooperative agreements, or they may be covert and tacit. Since firms in coalitions act collaboratively,
the coalition often can be treated as a single player in modeling the competitive arena. Of course,
coalitions can break apart. Within coalitions, mixed motivations to compete for one's own gain and
to cooperate with other coalition members to defeat the common enemy (Pfeffer, 1981) suggest that
managerial understanding of coalitional dynamics also can be modeled with game theoretic
formulations.
Strategies
Strategies are the alternative actions that a player believes are options in a given situation.
Game theory research has been criticized because it oversimplifies the range of available strategies
(Saloner, 1991). In many game formulations, strategies are stylized into two generic alternatives.
For example, as portrayed in the illustrations in this paper, the two are often the competitive and
cooperative alternatives. This simplification is not a structural limitation of game theory (Camerer,
1991). If desired, game theoretic analysis can be constructed to accommodate a wide range of
choices. However, for understanding managerial cognitions about competitive dynamics, stylized
matrices may not only be justified, they may actually be preferred to more complex, albeit objectively
realistic, models. In theory, the strategic alternatives are many; but, abundant evidence from
cognitive psychology and strategic management suggests that decision makers quickly simplify their
options to a very restricted set (Cyert and March, 1963; Eisenhardt, 1989; Fiske and Taylor, 1984;
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Huff, 1990; Prahalad and Bettis, 1986; Schwenk, 1984). To do otherwise results in cognitive
overload and the inability to fully comprehend the options (Cyert and March, 1963; Duhaime and
Schwenk, 1985; Reger and Huff, 1993). The important issue in constructing cognitive models is to
elicit the options the firm perceives for itself and for its rivals.
Payoffs
Payoffs are associated with each strategy set. A payoff is the compensation a player believes
will result from a strategy, given the choices made by all other players. Payoffs can be profits,
market share gains, or sales; but, more generally, are the perceived utility or desirability of the
outcome to the player. Again, perceptions are critical. Managers are uncertain what consequences
will result from their strategic choices. They learn the payoff of a chosen strategy only after the
decision is made, and since extraneous events may have affected outcomes, even historical payoffs are
ambiguous at best (Weick, 1979). Executives never know the true value of choices not taken.
Managers, therefore, are forced to take action based on their beliefs that may be only loosely coupled
to objective reality. A cognitive approach to game theoretic modeling, therefore, focuses on eliciting
managerial perceptions and beliefs about payoffs rather than attempting to determine unbiased,
objective outcomes.
In sum, these parameters capture the essential elements of any competitive situation: players,
strategies and payoffs. With these ingredients, game theory can model key aspects of otherwise ill-
structured and ambiguous competitive situations. Since decision makers' perceptions about the
parameters are crucial to firm behavior, a cognitive approach focuses on executive beliefs about the
nature of competitive interdependencies (Porac and Thomas, 1990; Reger and Huff, 1993; Weigelt
and MacMillan, 1988), even if these beliefs are erroneous due to competitive blind spots (Zajac and
Bazerman, 1991).
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The Organization's Model
A final issue in constructing managerial cognitive models of competition is determining which
mental model within the organization matters for strategic action (Huff, 1990: Gioia and Chittipeddi,
1991). Decision makers in the same firm may hold divergent models and simply averaging them may
not capture the political dynamics that intercede between individual cognition and organizational
action (Fiol and Huff, 1992). There are a variety of ways to consolidate individual cognitive maps
into single group maps that represents the dominant belief structures of the top management team
(Eden, Jones and Sims, 1979; 1983; Huff, 1990; Weick and Bougon, 1986). Certainly, when
developing game theoretic models to describe industrial competition, it is critical that a firm's map
reflect the dominant beliefs that actually influence strategic decision making, and not just the beliefs
of a single individual (Hambrick and Mason, 1984; Prahalad and Bettis, 1986). Thus, a key
empirical issue in a managerial cognitive approach to game theoretic modeling is the need to construct
a group map representing the firm's belief structure.
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FIGURE 2
Alternative Game Theoretic Formulations
Prisoner's Dilemma Payoff Matrix
Player 2
C2 D2
Player 1
3,3 0,5
CI
(cell 1) (cell 2)
5,0 1,1
Dl
(cell 3) (cell 4)
CI
Player 1
Dl
Chicken Payoff Matrix
Player 2
C2 D2
3,3
(cell 1)
1,5
(cell 2)
5,1
(cell 3)
0,0
(cell 4)
Battle of the Sexes Payoff Matrix
Sony
BETA VHS
BETA
VHS Coalition
2,4*
(cell 1)
0,0
(cell 2)
1,1
(cell 3)
4,2
(cell 4)
VHS
* 2,4 are the classic cell 1 payoffs for a generic Battle of the Sexes game. Since Sony refused
to allow rivals to choose this cell, the payoffs are irrelevant.
Table 1
Comparison of Three Approaches to Game Theory
Mathematical Behavioral Cognitive
Rationality
Players
Alternatives
Payoffs
Strategies
Market
Signals
Competitive
Reputation
assumed
inferred
from
observation
elicited
directly
specified
by
researcher
specified
by
experimenter
elicited
directly
specified
by
researcher
specified
by
experimenter
elicited
directly
specified
by
researcher
specified
by
experimenter
elicited
directly
specified
by
researcher
inferred from
observation
or
elicited
directly
elicited
directly
level and
type
specified
manipulated by
experimenter
or
observed in
experimental play
elicited
directly
specified
by
researcher
manipulated by
experimenter
or
observed in
experimental play
elicited
directly
ENDNOTES
1 . There are two real-world business examples where manager's implicitly (if not explicitly) understand
that their firm may be gored on the horns of a prisoner's dilemma. First, a fair-price amendment has been
proposed by a target firm's managers as a corporate charter antitakeover defense that may be for the purpose
of solving a prisoner's dilemma that has been induced by an acquirer's two-tiered tender offer (for a clear
game-theoretic analysis of why the two-tiered tender offer puts the target firm's stockholders in a prisoner's
dilemma, see Dixit and Nalebuff, 1991, pp. 81-84; the fair price amendment prohibits the firm from
entertaining any two-tiered offer). The fair-price amendment limits the options of a firm's stockholders and
this loss of flexibility may be a strategic advantage. This example is a special case of an idea expressed by
Schelling (1960) who calls:
attention to an important class of tactics, of a kind that is peculiarly appropriate to the logic of
indeterminate situations [e.g., the bilateral monopoly between one acquirer and one unique target
firm]. The essence of these tactics is some voluntary but irreversible sacrifice of freedom of choice.
They rest on the paradox that the power to constrain an adversary may depend on the power to bind
oneself: that in bargaining weakness is often strength, freedom may be freedom to capitulate, and
to burn bridges behind one may suffice to undo an opponent (1960: 22).
The sacrifice of the stockholders' freedom to accept a two^tier offer enables the target firm's stockholders
to avoid the prisoner's dilemma.
Second, Oster refers to a most favored nation (MFN) clause found in some sales contracts as a
"facilitating device to ease coordination difficulties" (1990: 217). Under this clause, the seller agrees that
if their firm offers any buyer a lower price during a specified period of time for a particular item, that same
price will be given to the firm with which the MFN has been signed. The MFN clause is another example
of Schelling's powerful insight above. Through a MFN clause the firm's true incentives have been
voluntarily, conspicuously, and irreversibly changed. By reducing the firm's flexibility and reducing options
for lowering price (i.e., lowering price is now prohibitively costly), the firm may increase profits. (See
Scherer and Ross, 1990: 208-213 for a game theoretic analysis of how General Electric and Westinghouse
were initially in a prisoner's dilemma each charging low price and how their mutual adoption of the MFN
clause transformed the payoff matrix to encourage cooperation in the pricing of turbogenerators in the 1964-
1976 period.)
2 . Thus, for the purposes of our paper, we will not distinguish between signaling models where information
is sent intendedly and screening models where information may not be provided intendedly (see Rasmusen,
1989).
3 . Signaling models in economics have also been used by researchers to tell stories which we find
unconvincing. For example, while signaling models can make the case that antitakeover amendments are
adopted to maximize stockholder wealth, the main case is almost certainly management favoring (Jarrell and
Poulsen, 1987; Mahoney and Mahoney, 1993). To be blunt, signaling models can be used to explain just
about anything. For an example that makes this point while bringing some fun into these games, see
Postrel's (1991) Flaming Trouser Equilibrium. We suggest that, upon closer scrutiny, Postrel's seat of the
pants argument also goes up in smoke. To be fair to signaling models and game theory in general, we do
acknowledge Saloner's arguments that game theory: (1) provides an "audit trail" of the detailed logic that
underlies assertions; (2) creates novel insights; and (3) provides a common language for cumulative learning.
Nevertheless, Saloner does admit that: "the degree of modeling discretion is so significant that a model can
be devised to explain almost any fact" (1991: 129). To paraphrase the economist Joan Robinson, strategic
management students should study game theory so that they are not fooled by game theorists. The message
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of our paper is that game theorists should be grounded in a better understanding of managerial cognition
about competitors or they may wind up fooling themselves. Game theory, after all, is not self-contained but
is only a tool. Kreps (1992) paper on "(How) can game theory contribute to a unified theory of organiza-
tion?" begins with the following statement: "almost any theory of organization which is addressed by game
theory will do more for game theory than game theory will do for it" (1992: 1). Similarly, Williamson
argues that: "Not only is the relation between organization theory and game theory a two-way street, but
game theory is the principal beneficiary!" (1993: 107).
4. Game-theoretic models of a firm's competitive reputation for pricing strategy were pioneered by Kreps
and Wilson (1982b) and Milgrom and Roberts (1982). These models are based on the presumptions that
each player maximizes perfectly and completely against the strategies of her opponents, and the character
of those opponents and of their strategies are perfectly known, and that players are able to evaluate all their
options. Of course, none of these conditions may be met in all respects in real-time competition.
5. Cooper, DeJong, Forsythe and Ross (1989) provide some experimental evidence that "cheaptalk" can
in fact make a difference in the Battle of the Sexes game. They found a preplay announcement by one
player improved coordination dramatically. Simultaneous cheaptalk by both players led to more conflict.
Cheaptalk, however, appears useless in the Game of Chicken. Rubinstein notes that: "although language
plays a crucial role in resolving conflicts, game theory has so far been unable to capture this role" (1991:
921).
6 . The classic interpretation of the PD game is provided by Luce and Raiffa:
Two suspects are taken into custody and separated. The district attorney is certain that they are
guilty of a specific crime, but he does not have adequate evidence to convict them at a trial. He
points out to each prisoner that each has two alternatives: To confess to the crime the police are
sure they have done, or not to confess. If they both do not confess, then the district attorney states
he will book them on some very minor trumped-up charge such as petty larceny and illegal
possession of a weapon, and they will both receive minor punishment; if they both confess they will
be prosecuted, but he will recommend less than the most severe sentence; but if one confesses and
the other does not, then the confessor will receive lenient treatment for turning state's evidence
whereas the latter will get "the book" slapped at him (1957:95).
Converting the classic interpretation to standard game theory notation, the PD payoff matrix is represented
in the top panel of Figure 2, where CI and C2 are cooperative moves for players 1 and 2 respectively
(cooperative with each other, or refusing to confess), and Dl and D2 are "defecting", or competitive moves
for players 1 and 2, respectively. Player 1 payoffs are listed first in the payoff matrix. The numbers in the
matrix correspond to the utility or desirability of the payoff such that 5 > 3 > 1 > following one convention
that has been used extensively in behavioral research (Oskamp, 1972).
7. Researchers (several folk) have already proved a "folk theorem" stating that any outcome in the range
from total cooperation to total defection is possible in the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma (Fudenberg and
Tirole, 1986). Myerson (1992: 332) prefers the phrase general feasibility theorem in place of the "folk
theorem", because naming a theorem for the fact that it is part of an oral folk tradition in game theory
conveys no useful information for the pragmatically oriented.
8 . A dominant strategy equilibrium is a strategy combination consisting of each player's dominant strategy.
A weaker equilibrium concept for static games of complete information is a Nash equilibrium (Nash, 1950).
A strategy combination is a Nash equilibrium if no player has incentive to deviate from her strategy given
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that the other players do not deviate. Every dominant strategy equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium, but not
every Nash equilibrium is a dominant strategy equilibrium. Other important equilibrium concepts include:
subgame perfect (Nash) equilibrium (Selten, 1965) that rules out Nash equilibrium which rely on players that
make "empty threats" in dynamic games of complete information. For games with incomplete information,
a Bayesian Nash equilibrium (Harsanyi, 1967) is an established solution concept, while for dynamic games
of incomplete information perfect Bayesian (Nash) equilibrium (Selten, 1975) and sequential equilibrium
(Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991b; Kreps and Wilson, 1982a) have been developed. While our paper provides
an overview of the "forest" of game theory, the student of strategy must still study these (extensive form
game) "trees" (see e.g., Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991a; Gibbons, 1992; Myerson, 1991). Weigelt and
Camerer argue that: "the study of sequential equilibria in incomplete-information games may begin to finally
fulfill the potential for applications of game theory to strategy research" (1988: 446).
9 . The classic interpretation of the chicken game comes from the teenage automobile game of the same
name. Two drivers aim their cars at each other and speed toward a head-on collision. The first driver to
turn away from the collision is the "chicken" and the loser. However, if neither driver turns away, both
risk death in a head-on collision.
10. Murnighan (1991:46) notes that: "The Battle of the Sexes is intriguingly but unfortunately named. The
sexes certainly have had and will have battles like this. But disputes of this kind are not restricted to the
sexes. Anyone can have a conflict like this!" In the original version the man wants to go to the prize fight
and the woman wants to go to the ballet. While selfish, they are deeply in love, and would, if necessary,
sacrifice their preferences to be with each other. When the Battle of the Sexes game is played sequentially,
it provides a stylized example of "first-mover advantages" (Lieberman and Montgomery, 1988; Spence,
1981). The text provides a business example involving Sony.
11. This example and the personal computer example to follow are stylized based on popular press
reports. The cases are presented to illustrate the Battle of the Sexes game and the authors acknowledge that
in both cases, the true evolution of the industries is more complex, and thus open to multiple interpretations.
12. Similarly, Fudenberg and Tirole note that: "the likely outcome of a game depends on more
information than is provided by the strategic form [game]. For example, one would like to know how much
experience the players have with games of this sort, whether they come from a common culture and thus
might share certain expectations about how the game will be played, and so on" (1991a, p. 13). For
example, Schelling's (1960) "focal points" depend on the players' culture and past experience.
31
REFERENCES
Bernheim, D. and M. Whinston (1986). 'Common agency', Econometrica , 54, pp. 923-942.
Bowman C. and G. Johnson (1992). 'Surfacing competitive strategies', The European Management
Journal . 10(2), pp. 210-219.
Bruderer, E. and W. Mitchell (1992). 'Commentary: The use of experimental economics in strategy
research.' In P. Shrivastava, A. Huff and J. Dutton (eds.), Advances in Strategic
Management, Volume 8, JAI Press, Greenwich, Connecticut, pp. 201-205.
Camerer, C. F. (1985). 'Redirecting research in business policy and strategy', Strategic
Management Journal
. 6, pp. 1-16.
Camerer, C. F. (1991). 'Does strategy research need game theory?' Strategy Management Journal
.
12 (Winter), pp. 137-152.
Conner, K. Reavis (1988). 'Strategies for product cannibalism', Strategic Management Journal . 9
(Special Issue), pp. 9-26.
Cooper, R., D. V. DeJong, R. Forsythe and T. W. Ross (1989). 'Communication in the battle of the
sexes game: Some experimental results', Rand Journal of Economics . 20, pp. 568-587.
Cyert, R. and J. March, J. (1963). A Behavioral Theory of the Firm . Prentice Hall, Englewood
Cliffs, New Jersey.
Daniels, K. and G. Johnson (1992). 'Manager's mental models of competitive industry structures',
Presented at the Strategic Management Society Meetings, London.
Dixit, A. and B. J. Nalebuff (1991). Thinking Strategically . W. W. Norton and Company, New
York.
Duhaime, I. M. and C. R. Schwenk (1985). 'Conjectures on cognitive simplification in acquisition
and divestment decision making', Academy of Management Review . 10, pp. 287-295.
Dutton, J. E. (1993). 'Interpretations on automatic: A different view of strategic issue diagnosis',
Journal of Management Studies , forthcoming.
Eden, C, S. Jones and D. Sims (1979). Thinking in Organizations . Macmillan, London.
Eden, C, S. Jones and D. Sims (1983). Messing about in Problems . Pergamon, Elmsford, NY.
Eisenhardt, K. M. (1989). 'Making fast strategic decisions in high-velocity environments', Academy
of Management Journal , 32, pp. 543-576.
Farrell, J. (1987). 'Cheap talk, coordination, and entry', Rand Journal of Economics . 18, pp. 34-39.
32
Finkelstein, S. and D. C. Hambrick (1990). 'Top management team tenure and organizational
outcomes: The moderating role of managerial discretion', Administrative Science Quarterly ,
35, pp. 484-504.
Fiol, CM. and A. S. Huff (1992). 'Maps for managers: Where are we? Where do we go from
here?' Journal of Management Studies , 29, pp. 267-285.
Fisher, F. M. (1989). 'Games economists play: A noncooperative view', Rand Journal of
Economics , 20, pp. 113-124.
Fiske, S. T. and S. T. Taylor (1984). Social Cognition . Addison-Wesley, Reading, Mass.
Fombrun, C. and M. Shanley (1990). 'What's in a name? Reputation building and corporate
strategy', Academy of Management Journal , 33, pp. 233-258.
Fombrun, C. and E. Zajac (1987). 'Structural and perceptual influences in intraindustry
stratifications,' Academy of Management Journal , 30, pp. 33-50.
Friedman, J. W. (1977). Oligopoly and the Theory of Games . Amsterdam: North-Holland
Publishing.
Fruhan, W. E. (1972). The Fight for Competitive Advantage: A Study of the United States
Domestic Trunk Air Carriers . Division of Research, Graduate School of Business, Harvard
University, Boston, Mass.
Fudenberg, D. and E. Maskin (1986). The Folk Theorem in repeated games with discounting or with
incomplete information. Econometrica , 54: 533-554.
Fudenberg, D. and J. Tirole (1989). 'Noncooperative game theory for industrial organization: An
introduction and overview.' In R. Schmalensee and R.D. Willig (eds.), Handbook of
Industrial Organization , volume I, Elsevier, New York, pp. 260-327.
Fudenberg, D. and J. Tirole (1991a). Game Theory . MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass.
Fudenberg, D. and J. Tirole (1991b). 'Perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium,'
Journal of Economic Theory , 53, 236-260.
Gibbons, R. (1992). Game Theory for Applied Economists . Princeton University Press, Princeton,
New Jersey.
Gioia, D. A. and K. Chittipeddi (1991). 'Sensemaking and sensegiving in strategic change initiative',
Strategic Management Journal , 12, pp. 433-448.
Green, L. and J. Kagel, (Eds.) (1990). Advances in Behavioral Economics . Volume 2, Ablex
Publishing Company, Norwood, New Jersey.
Gripsrud, G. and K. Gronhaug (1985). 'Structure and strategy in grocery retailing: A sociocognitive
approach', The Journal of Industrial Economics , 33, pp. 339-347.
33
Hambrick, D. and P. Mason (1984). 'Upper echelons: The organization as a reflection of its top
managers'. Academy of Management Review , 9, 193- 206.
Harrigan, K. R. (1985). Strategies for Joint Ventures . Lexington Books, Lexington, Mass.
Harsanyi, J. (1967). 'Games with incomplete information played by Bayesian players, Parts I, II and
III. Management Science . 14, pp. 159-182; 320-324; 486-502.
Heil, O., and Robertson, T. S. (1991). 'Toward a theory of competitive market signaling: A
research agenda', Strategic Management Journal
. 12: 403-418.
Huff, A. S. (1982). 'Industry influence on strategy reformulation', Strategic Management Journal ,
3, 119-131.
Huff, A. S. (1990). Mapping Strategic Thought . Wiley, Chichester.
Jacquemin, A. (1987). The New Industrial Organization: Market Forces and Strategic Behavior .
MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass.
Jarrell, G. A. and A. B. Poulsen (1987). 'Shark repellents and stock prices: The effects of
antitakeover amendments since 1980' Journal of Financial Economics , 19, pp. 127-168.
Karnani, A. and B. Wernerfelt (1985). 'Multiple point competition'. Strategic Management Journal ,
6, pp. 87-96.
Komorita, S. S. and T. M. Tumonis (1980). 'Extensions and tests of some descriptive theories of
coalition formation', Journal of Personality and Social Psychology , 39, pp. 256-268.
Kreps, D. (1990a). A Course in Microeconomic Theory . Princeton University Press, Princeton.
Kreps, D. (1990b). Game Theory and Economic Modelling . Clarendon Press, Oxford.
Kreps, D. (1992). '(How) can game theory lead to a unified theory of organization?", unpublished
manuscript.
Kreps, D. and R. Wilson (1982a). 'Sequential equilibria', Econometrica , 50, 863-894.
Kreps, D. and R. Wilson (1982b). 'Reputation and imperfect information', Journal of Economic
Theory . 27, pp. 253-279.
Lieberman, M. and D. Montgomery (1988). 'First-mover advantages', Strategic Management
Journal
. 9 (Summer): pp. 41-58.
Luce, R. D., and H. Raiffa (1957). Games and Decisions . Wiley, New York.
MacMillan, I., M. L. McCaffery and G. Van Wijk (1985). 'Competitors' responses to easily
imitated new products—Exploring commercial banking product innovations'. Strategic
Management Journal
. 6, pp. 75-86.
34
Mahoney, J. M. and J. T. Mahoney (1993). 'An empirical investigation of the effect of corporate
charter antitakeover amendments on stockholder wealth', Strategic Management Journal , 14,
pp. 17-31.
Mason, R. and I. Mitroff (1981). Challenging Strategic Planning Assumptions . Wiley, New York.
Milgrom, P. and J. Roberts (1982). 'Limit pricing under incomplete information', Econometrica ,
50, pp. 443-460.
Montgomery, C. A. (1988). 'Guest editor's introduction to the special issue on research in the
content of strategy', Strategic Management Journal , 9 (Summer), pp. 3-8.
Montgomery, C. A., B. Wernerfelt and S. Balakrishnan (1989). 'Strategy content and the research
process: A critique and commentary', Strategic Management Journal . 10, pp. 189-197.
Murnighan, J. K. (1991). The Dynamics of Bargaining Games . Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs,
New Jersey.
Murnighan, J. K., S. S. Komorita and E. Szwajkowski (1977). 'Theories of coalition formation and
the effects of reference groups', Journal of Personality and Social Psychology . 13, 166-181.
Myerson, R. B. (1991). Game Theory: Analysis of Conflict . Harvard University Press, Cambridge,
Mass.
Nash, J. (1950). 'Equilibrium points in N-person games', Proceedings of the National Academy of
Sciences , 36, pp. 48-49.
Oskamp, S. (1972). 'Effects of programmed strategies on cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma and
other mixed-motive game.' In L. S. Wrightsman, Jr., J. O'Conner, and N. J. Baker (eds.),
Cooperation and Competition: Reading on Mixed-Motive Games , pp. 147-187.
Oster, S. M. (1990). Modern Competitive Analysis . Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Pfeffer, J. (1981). Power in Organizations . Pitman, Marshfield, Mass.
Porac, J. F., H. Thomas and C. Baden-Fuller (1989). 'Competitive groups as cognitive communities:
The case of Scottish knitwear manufacturers', Journal of Management Studies , 15, pp. 397-
416.
Porac, J. F. and H. Thomas (1990). 'Taxonomic mental models in competitor definition', Academy
of Management Review , 15, pp. 224-240.
Porter, M. E. (1980). Competitive Strategy . Free Press, New York.
Porter, M. E. and A. M. Spence (1982). 'The capacity expansion process in a growing oligopoly:
The case of corn wet milling.' In J. J. McCall (ed.). The Economics of Information and
Uncertainty , The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, pp. 259-316.
35
Postrel, S. (1991). 'Burning your britches behind you: Can policy scholars bank on game theory?'
Strategic Management Journal . 12 (Winter): pp. 153-155.
Prahalad, C. K. and R. A. Bettis (1986). 'The dominant logic: A new linkage between diversity
and performance', Strategic Management Journal . 7. pp. 485-501.
Rapoport, A., and M. A. Guyer (1966). 'A taxonomy of 2x2 games', General Systems , 11, pp.
203-214.
Rasmusen, E. (1989). Games and Information: An Introduction to Game Theory . Basil Blackwell,
Oxford.
Reger, R. K. and A. S. Huff (1993). 'Strategic groups: A cognitive perspective', Strategic
Management Journal
. 14, pp. 103-124.
Reger, R. K. and C. Noble (1992). 'Understanding competition in transforming industries: Is a
department store by any other name still a specialty store?' Paper presented at the Strategic
Management Society Meetings, London.
Rubinstein, A. (1991). 'Comments on the interpretation of game theory,' Econometrica . 59, 909-
924.
Saloner, G. (1991). Modeling, game theory, and strategic management. Strategic Management
Journal . 12 (Winter), pp. 119-136.
Schelling, T. C. (1960). The Strategy of Conflict . Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass.
Scherer, F. M. and D. Ross (1990). Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance .
Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, Mass.
Schwenk, C. R. (1984). 'Cognitive simplification process in strategic decision making', Strategic
Management Journal
. 5, pp. 111-128.
Schwenk, C. R. and H. Thomas (1983). 'Formulating the mess: The role of decision aids in problem
formulation', Omega . 11(3), pp. 239-252.
Selten, R. (1965). 'Spieltheoretische behandlung eines oligopolmodells mit nachfragtragheit'
Zeitschrift fur Gesamte Staatswissenschaft . 121, pp. 301-324.
Selten, R. (1975). 'Re-examination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive
games', International Journal of Game Theory . 4, pp. 25-55.
Shapiro,. C. (1989). 'The theory of business strategy', Rand Journal of Economics , 20, pp. 125-137.
Simon, H. A. (1982). Models of Bounded Rationality: Behavioral Economics and Business
Organization . MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass.
36
Spence, A. M. (1981). 'The learning curve and competition', Bell Journal of Economics , 12, pp.
49-70.
Sultan, R. G. M. (1974). Pricing in the Electrical Oligopoly . Vol. 1, Graduate School of Business
Administration, Harvard University, Boston, Mass.
Sultan, R. G. M. (1975). Pricing in the Electrical Oligopoly . Vol. 2, Division of Research, Graduate
School of Business Administration, Harvard University, Boston, Mass.
Thomas, H. (1982). 'Screening policy options: An approach and a case study example', Strategic
Management Journal , 3, pp. 227-245.
Tirole, J. (1988). The Theory of Industrial Organization . MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass.
Von Neumann, J. and O. Morgenstern (1944). Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (1947
edition) Princeton University Press, Princeton.
Weick, K. E. (1979). The Social Psychology of Organizing . (2nd ed.) Addison-Wesley, Reading,
Mass.
Weick, K. E. and M. G. Bougon (1986). 'Organizations as cognitive maps', In H. P. Sims, Jr. and
D. A. Gioia (eds.), The Thinking Organization , Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, pp. 102-135.
Weigelt, K. and I. MacMillan (1988). 'An interactive strategic analysis framework', Strategic
Management Journal , 9 (Special Issue), pp. 27-40.
Weigelt, K., C. F. Camerer and M. Hanna (1992). 'The use of experimental economics in strategy
research', In P. Shrivastava, J. Dutton, and A. Huff (eds.). Advances in Strategic
Management, Volume 8 , JAI Press, Greenwich, Conn., pp. 163-200.
Wernerfelt, B. and A. Karnani (1987). 'Competitive strategy under uncertainty', Strategic
Management Journal , 8, pp. 187-195.
Williamson, O. E. (1993). 'Transaction cost economics meets Posnerian law and economies'.
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics , 149, pp. 99-118.
Zajac, E. J. and M. H. Bazerman (1991). 'Blind spots in industry and competitor analysis:
Implications of interfirm (mis)perceptions for strategic decisions', Academy of Management
Review , 16, pp. 37-56.
37



HECKMAN
BINDERY INC.
JUN95
„; N MANCHESTER.
INDIANA 46962

